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 NOTE 
Assuming the Worst: Eliminating the 
Forcibly Steals Element from Second-Degree 
Robbery 
State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
ROSS VALORE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri recently decided two cases dealing with 
the troubling distinction between second-degree robbery and stealing.1  The 
crimes of second-degree robbery and stealing are distinguished by whether 
the defendant uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force in the 
commission of the offense.2  After three decades of disagreement within Mis-
souri appellate courts over what standard should be applied when determining 
whether the defendant used or threatened the immediate use of physical force, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri stepped in to resolve the conflict in the case 
of State v. Brooks.3  Unfortunately, the objective standard the court articulat-
ed was unclear in its application and will likely cause more confusion in the 
lower courts that try to interpret it.  In an attempt to resolve the confusion 
surrounding the court’s decision in Brooks, this Note attempts to define the 
standard articulated by the court, while also looking at alternative ways the 
Missouri General Assembly can resolve the conflict between robbery and 
stealing. 
This Note begins with an exploration of the factual circumstances that 
gave rise to the court’s determination that an objective standard should be 
applied when determining whether a threat of the immediate use of physical 
force exists in second-degree robbery cases.  This Note then discusses the 
conflict among Missouri appellate courts regarding the determination of 
 
* B.S., Grand Valley State University, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2016.  Senior Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 
2015–2016.  I would like to offer a sincere thank you to Professor Trachtenberg for 
his guidance through the learning, writing, and editing process of this Note.  I would 
also like to thank the Missouri Law Review for its assistance in the writing and editing 
of this Note and Brett Favre for continuing to provide me with inspiration each day. 
 1. See State v. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc); State v. 
Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 2. MO. REV. STAT. § 569.030 (2000) (defining second-degree robbery); id. § 
569.010(1) (defining stealing). 
 3. 446 S.W.3d 673. 
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whether a threat of force exists, while also looking at how other states have 
handled this issue. Next, this Note provides an analysis of the Supreme Court 
of Missouri’s reasoning in Brooks and, finally, explores how the objective 
standard articulated by the court will be applied, along with a possible alter-
native solution to the conflict between stealing and robbery in bank theft cas-
es. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On August 25, 2011, Claude Dale Brooks entered a Regions Bank in St. 
Charles County dressed in a baggy sweatshirt, baseball hat, sunglasses, and 
dreadlocked wig.4  When Brooks arrived at the counter, he handed the bank 
teller a note.5  The note read, “Fifties, hundreds, no bait money and bottom 
drawer.”6  The bank teller, Angela Ebaugh, typically worked at the drive-
through window, but had moved to the lobby that day because the bank was 
busy.7  After reading the note, Ebaugh slowly began to walk away from the 
counter to retrieve the money from her drawer near the drive-through win-
dow.8  Unsure of what Ebaugh was doing, Brooks slammed his hand on the 
counter and told her to “get back here.”9 
Brooks then instructed Ebaugh to take the money from her drawer in the 
lobby, and Ebaugh explained that there was no money in that drawer and that 
she would have to go to the drawer by the drive-through to retrieve the cash.10  
Brooks watched intently as Ebaugh walked to the drive-through window, 
collected the bills from the bottom drawer, and laid the money on the counter 
in front of him.11  Brooks also requested his note back, and Ebaugh com-
plied.12  Brooks then took the money, put it in a shopping bag, and left the 
bank.13 
Once Brooks exited the bank, Ebaugh signaled the police by putting her 
bait bills on the counter.14  When the police arrived, Ebaugh provided a de-
scription of Brooks and the events that had taken place at the bank.15  The 
police noted that Ebaugh seemed quite nervous and upset.16 
 
 4. Appellant’s Substitute Brief at 6, Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673 (No. SC 94154), 
2014 WL 4277591, at *6. 
 5. Respondent’s Brief at 4, Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673 (No. SC 94154), 2013 WL 
5405170, at *4. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at *5. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at *5. 
 11. Id. at *5–6. 
 12. Appellant’s Substitute Brief, supra note 4, at *7. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at *8. 
 16. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 5, at *6. 
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Meanwhile, a separate officer also responded to the call and began pa-
trolling the area where Brooks was last seen.17  The officer noticed Brooks 
walking down the sidewalk on a street near the bank, but he did not have 
dreadlocks or a hat as the description provided.18 Nevertheless, the officer 
stopped Brooks to ask him whether he had seen anyone matching the descrip-
tion the officer provided.19  Brooks replied that he saw someone matching 
that description running in the area and told the officer what direction he was 
heading.20  While questioning Brooks, the officer noticed that he appeared to 
be nervous and out of breath, and as Brooks began to walk away, the officer 
told him to stop.21  Brooks ignored the officer’s request, and after the officer 
told him to stop a second time, Brooks began running.22 
The officer notified the patrol officer in the area that the suspect was 
running in his direction, and the second officer stopped Brooks and put him 
in handcuffs.23  Upon searching Brooks, the officer found a brown plastic bag 
with money inside that matched the amount Ebaugh believed was stolen from 
the bank.24  Shortly after Brooks was placed under arrest, the dreadlocked 
wig and baseball hat were found in a storm drain nearby.25 
Brooks was charged with robbery in the second degree.26  In a bench tri-
al, Brooks admitted to stealing money from the bank, but he denied commit-
ting a robbery in the second degree, arguing that he did not use or threaten the 
use of immediate physical force.27  A person commits robbery when, “in the 
course of stealing, . . . he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical 
force upon another person.”28  Based on this argument, Brooks moved for 
acquittal at the close of the evidence.29  The trial court denied the motion and 
found Brooks guilty of robbery in the second degree.30  The trial court rea-
soned that “his disguise, the note he handed the teller, his unusual knowledge 
of bank procedure, and the gesture of slamming his hand down on the bank 
counter ‘show[ed] . . . an actual immediate threat of physical force.’”31  The 
trial court handed down a twenty-five-year sentence to Brooks, classifying 
 
 17. Appellant’s Substitute Brief, supra note 4, at *8. 
 18. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 5, at *6. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Appellant’s Substitute Brief, supra note 4, at *8. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at *8–9. 
 24. Id. at *9. 
 25. Id. 
 26. State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 27. Id. at 674–75. 
 28. MO. REV. STAT. § 569.010(1) (2000). 
 29. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 674–75. 
 30. Id. at 675. 
 31. Id. 
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him as a prior and persistent offender because of his two previous federal 
bank robbery convictions.”32 
Brooks appealed this decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the 
Eastern District, which, in a 2-1 decision, vacated Brooks’s conviction for 
robbery in the second degree.33  In making its decision, the appellate court 
relied on Patterson v. State, which states that the use of force “may be im-
plied from the fact that the defendant displayed a weapon, engaged in behav-
ior that gave the appearance that he was armed, or used [a] phrase[] like, 
‘This is a holdup.’”34  The appellate court reasoned that because Brooks had 
not threatened physical force, had no weapon, and did nothing to indicate that 
he had a weapon, there was no affirmative act, beyond stealing, that justified 
his conviction for second-degree robbery.35  The dissenting opinion found the 
majority’s articulation of what constituted an affirmative act too narrow and 
reasoned that Brooks’s knowledge of bank procedure, disguise, note, and 
slamming of his hand on the counter was sufficient evidence that Brooks’s 
actions constituted a threat of physical force.36 
On transfer, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court’s 
ruling that Brooks’s actions constituted a threat of immediate physical force 
and that he was correctly convicted of second-degree robbery.37  The court 
relied on United States v. Gilmore, which held that a demand for money in a 
bank was an “implicit threat of the use of force in and of itself.”38  The court 
held that Brooks’s disguise, the note, slamming his fist on the counter and 
telling Ebaugh to “get back here,” along with his apparent knowledge of bank 
procedure, was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to infer that Brooks 
would use immediate physical force if his demands were not met.39 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Over the past three decades, Missouri courts have struggled to distin-
guish what constitutes an immediate threat of physical force in second-degree 
robbery cases where the defendant does not make physical contact with the 
victim or use verbal threats.  Some courts have held that simply stealing from 
a bank or a store is sufficient to find a threat of force,40 while other courts 
have required that the defendant engage in an affirmative threatening act to 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. State v. Brooks, No. ED99427, 2014 WL 606526, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 
18, 2014), aff’d, 446 S.W.3d 673. 
 34. Id. at *4 (alterations in original) (quoting Patterson v. State, 110 S.W.3d 896, 
904 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at *5–7 (Gaertner, J., dissenting). 
 37. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 677. 
 38. Id. at 676 (citing United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 
2002)). 
 39. Id. at 677. 
 40. Id. at 676. 
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satisfy this element.41  This Part will first cover the different definitions of 
threat of force, then how Missouri courts have interpreted threat of force in 
the past, and finally, how other states have interpreted threat of force in rob-
bery cases. 
A.  Defining “Threat of Force” 
Second-degree robbery is defined as the “forcible stealing of proper-
ty.”42 Forcible stealing occurs when a person “‘in the course of stealing . . . 
uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for 
the purpose of’ either defeating resistance to the theft or compelling the sur-
render of the property.”43  The crimes of second-degree robbery and stealing 
are distinguished by whether the defendant uses or threatens the immediate 
use of physical force in the commission of the offense.44  Unfortunately, the 
statute does not go on to define what a threat of force is, and there is not any 
legislative commentary to offer guidance.45 
As a result of this lack of guidance, there was considerable disagreement 
regarding how the threat of force is determined when the defendant does not 
verbally threaten or make physical contact with the victim.  Some courts have 
used an objective standard as, “whether a reasonable person would believe 
[the defendant’s] conduct was a threat of the immediate use of physical 
force.”46  Under this standard, the trier of fact uses the victim’s and witness’s 
testimony, along with other circumstantial evidence, to determine whether a 
reasonable person would believe the defendant’s conduct constituted an im-
mediate threat of physical force.47 
A second approach looks at whether the defendant engaged in any af-
firmative conduct that exhibits a threat of immediate physical force.48  A re-
cent Missouri decision, State v. Coleman, reasoned that a victim’s objectively 
reasonable fear is not enough, as there “must be some affirmative conduct on 
the part of the defendant, beyond the mere act of stealing, which communi-
cates that he will immediately employ ‘physical force’ if the victim resist[s] . . 
. the taking of the property.”49 
 
 41. State v. Coleman, No. WD 76520, 2014 WL 4815414, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Sept. 30, 2014), aff’d, 463 S.W.3d. 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 42. MO. REV. STAT. § 569.030 (2000). 
 43. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 675 (quoting § 569.010.1). 
 44. Robert H. Dierker, Crimes Against Persons, 32 MO. PRAC., MISSOURI 
CRIMINAL LAW § 21.3 (2d ed. 2015). 
 45. § 569.030; see also State v. Applewhite, 771 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1989) (“Our statutes do not define the term ‘force’ itself nor do they define the quan-
tum of ‘force’ necessary to constitute forcible stealing.”). 
 46. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676. 
 47. See id. 
 48. State v. Coleman, No. WD 76520, 2014 WL 4815414, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. 
Sept. 30, 2014), aff’d, 463 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 49. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 569.010 (2000)). 
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A third approach is one taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit when prosecuting under the federal bank robbery statute.50  
The Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes statute altered the typical language 
of robbery statutes by adding intimidation to the types of threats defendants 
could make in order to avoid the “incongruous results” that would commonly 
arise when the defendant would not use or threaten force during the commis-
sion of the crime and, therefore, would not be liable under the statue for rob-
bery.51  Taking by intimidation is defined as “the willful taking in such a way 
as would place an ordinary person in fear of bodily harm.”52  In interpreting 
this statute, courts have consistently rejected the argument that affirmative 
threats of bodily harm, threatening body signals, or the possibility of a con-
cealed weapon are required to establish bank robbery under the federal stat-
ute.53 
B.  How Threat of Force Has Been Interpreted in Missouri 
There has been a significant split in Missouri courts in determining what 
constitutes a threat of force in second-degree robbery cases.  Appellate courts 
across the state have applied confusing and often contradictory reasoning 
when determining what constitutes a threat of force, resulting in differing 
outcomes – depending on which court hears the case.  The following cases 
illustrate the confusion. 
In State v. Carter, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District 
overturned a conviction for second-degree robbery, finding there was no 
force or threat of force used when the defendant reached into the victim’s 
pocket and took her purse.54  In Carter, the victim and her grandson were 
walking to their car in a Family Dollar parking lot when the defendant ap-
proached the victim and started asking questions about her grandson.55  When 
the victim turned her back to enter her vehicle, the defendant said, “Give me 
your purse,” and the defendant held out his hand.56  The victim then instruct-
ed the defendant to take the purse out of her coat pocket, and the defendant 
reached into her coat pocket, took the purse, and ran away.57  The court rea-
soned that the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant used or threat-
ened to use physical force against the victim sufficient for a second-degree 
 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012). 
 51. See C. T. Drechsler, Validity and Construction of Federal Bank Robbery Act, 
59 A.L.R.2d 946 § 2(b) (1958). 
 52. United States v. Bingham, 628 F.2d 548, 548 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 53. Coleman, 2014 WL 4815414, at *7 n.7 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). 
 54. 967 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 55. Id. at 308. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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robbery conviction, because the defendant had no weapon and did not harm 
or threaten the victim.58 
In State v. Tivis, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District 
reversed a conviction for second-degree robbery because the defendant did 
not threaten the immediate use of physical force when stealing a purse from 
the victim.59  In Tivis, the defendant approached the victim as she was un-
loading her groceries from her car and asked if she was interested in purchas-
ing a stuffed pumpkin.60  The victim declined, and the defendant continued to 
follow the victim to her apartment door, where he “yanked” the purse off her 
shoulder and ran off.61  The victim testified that the defendant did not threat-
en her, there was no struggle when the purse was taken, and the defendant 
took the purse by the strap and did not touch her.62  In overturning the convic-
tion for second-degree robbery, the appellate court noted that the only evi-
dence of a threat of force was the defendant yanking the purse from the vic-
tim’s shoulder, but the defendant made no contact with the victim, and there 
was no struggle.63  The court reasoned that there was no “evidence in the case 
at bar of the use or threatened use of immediate physical force” and over-
turned the conviction for second-degree robbery.64 
In State v. Clark, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District 
affirmed a conviction for second-degree robbery because a note the defendant 
handed to the victim was reasoned to be a threat to use immediate force.65  In 
Clark, the defendant entered a fast food restaurant and handed the cashier a 
note that read, “This is a holdup.  Give me all the money in the register.”66  
The cashier took the bills out of the register and laid them on the counter, and 
the defendant grabbed them and ran out of the restaurant.67  The defendant 
appealed his conviction for second-degree robbery, arguing that he did not 
use or threaten to use force on the victim.68  The court noted in its opinion 
that there were no Missouri cases that had dealt with the issue of whether a 
defendant threatens to use immediate force when he hands the victim a note 
but engages in no other threatening behavior.69  The court relied on reasoning 
applied by a court in Pennsylvania, which found that “[t]he expression 
‘holdup,’ in its ordinary significance, means a forcible detention of the person 
held with the intent to commit robbery and implies the necessary force to 
 
 58. Id. at 309. 
 59. 884 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
 60. Id. at 29. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 30. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 790 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 66. Id. at 495–96. 
 67. Id. at 496. 
 68. Id. at 495. 
 69. Id. at 497. 
7
Valore: Assuming the Worst
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
316 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
carry out that purpose.”70  Applying this reasoning, the court held that the 
defendant’s note satisfied the element of forcibly steals in that the note was 
intended to cause an immediate threat of force so that the cashier would give 
the defendant the money in the register.71 
In State v. Henderson, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern 
District reversed a conviction for second-degree robbery where the defendant 
brushed the arm of the victim when grabbing money from the cash register.72  
In Henderson, the defendant entered a convenience store, took a drink from 
the cooler, and went to the clerk and handed her a five-dollar bill.73 When the 
clerk opened the cash register, the defendant jumped over the counter and 
grabbed the money out of the register and, in the process, “kind of brushed” 
the clerk’s arm, which caused her to jump back.74  In reasoning that the de-
fendant did not use force, the court stated that the brush amounted to “de min-
imus [sic] contact incidental to the money snatch” and was not a threat or use 
of force.75 
In State v. Coleman, a majority for the Missouri Court of Appeals for 
the Western District reversed the conviction for second-degree robbery of a 
defendant who told a bank teller to put money in a bag because the defendant 
engaged in no affirmative action which suggested immediate force or the 
threat of force.76  In Coleman, the defendant entered a bank wearing sun-
glasses and walked directly to the teller, leaned forward with his arms on the 
counter, and told her, “I need you to do me a favor.  Put the money in this 
bag.”77  The defendant handed the teller a bag, and while the teller was put-
ting the money in the bag, another employee approached the defendant.78  
The defendant told the employee, “Ma’am, stop where you are and don’t 
move any farther.”79  The employee obeyed the defendant’s instructions, the 
teller handed the defendant the bag of money, and the defendant then swiftly 
left the bank.80 
The majority in Coleman relied on the reasoning of Tivis, which the 
court interpreted to mean that a conviction for second-degree robbery requires 
that the defendant “communicated, through affirmative conduct and/or words, 
an intent to immediately use physical force if the victim fails to deliver up the 
 
 70. Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 397 So.2d 1153 (Fla. App. 1981) (citing State v. 
Anderson, 101 P. 198, 200 (1909)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. 310 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 73. Id. at 307. 
 74. Id. at 307–08. 
 75. Id. at 309. 
 76. No. WD 76520, 2014 WL 4815414, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014), 
aff’d, 463 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 77. Id. at *1. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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property or otherwise resists his taking of the property.”81  The Tivis opinion, 
summarized above, does not include the phrase “affirmative conduct,” which 
makes the reasoning applied by a majority of the Western District especially 
novel.82  The court in Coleman went on to explain the need for the affirmative 
conduct element by reasoning that “then virtually all stealing other than by 
means of deceit will be the same as robbery in the second degree.”83  By not 
enforcing the physical threat element of robbery in the second degree, the 
court would render the robbery in the second-degree statute superfluous.84  
Following this logic, the majority determined that the defendant’s words did 
not imply a threat of force and that his body language did not indicate that he 
possessed a weapon or had any intention to attack.85 
The dissent in Coleman argued that the majority incorporated a mens rea 
of “purposely” into both the conduct and result elements of the second-degree 
robbery statute, where the mens rea should only apply to the result element of 
the crime or to the “obtaining of property against the will of another.”86  Fur-
ther, the dissent argued that the objective standard – whether a reasonable 
person would conclude that the defendant engaged in conduct that threatened 
the immediate use of physical force – should have been used.87  The dissent 
concluded that a reasonable fact finder could find that the defendant’s objec-
tive was to have the teller deliver the money, and that a bad result would oc-
cur if she did not.88 
The Supreme Court of Missouri granted review and upheld Coleman’s 
conviction for second-degree robbery.89  Coleman attempted to distinguish 
his case from Brooks, arguing that he did not “make any threatening physical 
gestures or raise his voice in a threatening manner.”90 In holding that Cole-
man’s actions constituted an implicit threat of force, the court reiterated the 
objective standard announced in Brooks,91 and that a demand for money in a 
bank is an “implicit threat of the use of force in and of itself.”92  Further, the 
court dismissed Coleman’s argument that Brooks should be overturned be-
cause it stands for the proposition that all thefts from a bank would constitute 
 
 81. Id. at *3 (citing State v. Tivis, 884 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 82. See generally Tivis, 884 S.W.2d at 28. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at *6. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at *7. 
 89. State v. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 90. Id. at 354–55. 
 91. See State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 676 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (“[T]he 
existence of a threat depends on whether a reasonable person would believe [the de-
fendant’s] conduct was a threat of the immediate use of physical force, which is an 
objective test.”). 
 92. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d at 355. 
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second-degree robbery.93  The court stated that “neither Brooks nor this case 
holds that all thefts of money from a bank necessarily involve forcible steal-
ing and, therefore, constitute robbery.  Instead, these cases recognize that 
context matters.”94  The court reasoned that a theft from a bank would raise a 
“strong implication of a threat,” but the facts of each case would ultimately 
determine whether it constituted a threat or implied threat of the use of 
force.95 
C.  How Other States Interpret Threat of Force in Robbery Cases 
Other states have faced similar problems in trying to articulate what 
constitutes a threat of force when a victim of robbery is not touched or ver-
bally threatened.  There seems to be a pattern, and it appears in Missouri cas-
es as well, that while appellate courts tend to find that force or the threat of 
force was not present in close cases, trial and state supreme courts are more 
likely to find the defendant’s conduct was sufficient for a conviction of sec-
ond-degree robbery.  The following cases exhibit the uncertainty that courts 
face when trying to determine if a defendant has used or threatened physical 
force when the victim has not been touched or verbally threatened. 
In People v. Taylor, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of 
the appellate court, which vacated the robbery conviction of a defendant who 
stole a necklace off a victim without touching her.96  The Illinois Supreme 
Court reasoned that the necklace was attached to the victim, and removing it 
from her neck required force.97  In Taylor, the defendant approached the vic-
tim while she was talking on a payphone, snatched the necklace off of her 
neck, and then stared at her for an uncomfortable period before running 
away.98  Illinois defines robbery as the taking of property from the “person or 
presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of 
force.”99  In finding the defendant guilty of robbery, the court distinguished 
the taking of a necklace off of a person from the taking of a purse off of a 
shoulder, reasoning that when an item is “attached to the person of the victim 
in such a manner as to create a resistance to its taking,” it is sufficient to find 
the element of force.100  Interestingly, the court here did not find the defend-
ant used constructive force or the threat of force, but that the taking of the 
necklace constituted actual force.101 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 591 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ill. 1989). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 678. 
 99. Id. at 678–79 (quoting ILL. COMP. STAT. 1983 / 18-1(a) (West 2016)). 
 100. Id. at 681. 
 101. Id. 
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In State v. Collinsworth, the Washington State Court of Appeals af-
firmed the conviction for second-degree robbery of a defendant who robbed 
seven different banks using a similar method of demanding money from the 
teller, but using no force or verbal threats.102  In Collingsworth, the defendant 
would enter banks wearing baggy clothing and directly approach the teller, 
telling her some variant of “I need your hundreds, fifties and twenties,” and 
“No bait, no dye.”103  The teller in each scenario gave the money to the de-
fendant and testified to feeling threatened, even though no weapon was 
shown or indicated.104  Washington has a similar second-degree robbery stat-
ute to Missouri; it requires the State prove that the defendant took the money 
“by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of inju-
ry.”105 
The court noted that no previous Washington case had decided whether 
a defendant who does not use threating language or actual force is liable for 
robbery, so the court relied on decisions interpreting the federal bank robbery 
statute.106  The federal bank robbery statute criminalizes the “taking of prop-
erty from a bank ‘by force and violence, or by intimidation.’”107 Following 
cases interpreting the federal statute, the court reasoned that the literal mean-
ing of the words used by the defendant, although non-threating, were “fraught 
with the implicit threat to use force,” and that any threat, no matter how in-
significant, which causes a person to hand over their property is “sufficient to 
sustain a robbery conviction.”108 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The issue in Brooks was whether handing the bank teller a non-threating 
note, banging his fist on the counter, and having an apparent knowledge of 
bank procedure was sufficient to find that Brooks threatened the immediate 
use of physical force necessary for a second-degree robbery conviction.109  
Brooks argued on appeal that he did not threaten force because he had no 
weapon, did not engage in any behavior that gave the appearance that he had 
a weapon, and did not use threatening language during the theft.110  Judge Zel 
M. Fischer wrote the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri, 
which held that Brooks’s actions did constitute an immediate threat of physi-
cal force and affirmed Brooks’s conviction of second-degree robbery.111 
 
 102. 966 P.2d 905, 908–09 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
 103. Id. at 905–06. 
 104. Id. at 906. 
 105. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.56.190 (West 2016). 
 106. Collinsworth, 966 P.2d at 907–08. 
 107. Id. at 907 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012)). 
 108. Id. at 908. 
 109. State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 674, 677. 
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The court began its analysis by outlining the authority Brooks used to 
support his contention that he did not threaten the use of force.112  The court 
first identified Patterson, where the Missouri Court of Appeals for the West-
ern District articulated several factual scenarios Missouri courts should look 
to when determining whether the defendant threatened force.113  These factors 
include the presence of a weapon or behavior that would indicate the defend-
ant had a weapon and the use of phrases such as “[t]his is a holdup” or 
“stickup.”114  The court also noted Brooks’s use of Tivis,115 where the West-
ern District held that there was not a threat of force sufficient for a conviction 
of second-degree robbery when the defendant yanked a purse off of the vic-
tim’s shoulder.116 
The court then looked to the authority provided by the State to support 
its primary argument that Brooks’s actions constituted a threat of immediate 
physical force.  The court first identified State v. Rounds, where the Missouri 
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held that a defendant who had a 
hand in his pocket, implying he had a weapon, and who also told the victim 
not to “be a hero . . . or [the defendant] was going to blow [the victim’s] head 
off,” was sufficient evidence of a threat of immediate physical force.117  More 
on point, the court also noted the State’s use of State v. Duggar, where the 
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District held that a defendant 
threated force because he “had a firm purpose, an unusual knowledge of the 
internal security system in the cash register, and a hand concealed in his jack-
et,” which gave the appearance he was armed.118 
Further, the court referenced cases the State used to support its second-
ary argument that Brooks’s actions created the “inference of a threat of im-
mediate harm because he put the victim in fear.”119  In State v. Lybarger, the 
Western District reasoned that the defendant telling the victim, “This is a 
robbery,” while keeping his hand in his pocket, implied he had a gun and was 
sufficient evidence for a finding of an inference of a threat of immediate 
harm.120  Lastly, the court noted Applewhite, where the Eastern District held 
that a defendant who pushed a store employee as he fled the robbery had giv-
 
 112. Id. at 675. 
 113. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 675 (citing Patterson v. State, 110 S.W.3d 896 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2003)). 
 114. Id. (quoting Patterson, 110 S.W.3d at 904–05). 
 115. State v. Tivis, 884 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
 116. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 675–76. 
 117. Id. at 676 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rounds, 796 S.W.2d 84, 
86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 118. Id. (quoting State v. Duggar, 710 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (quoting State v. Lybarger, 165 S.W.3d 180, 186–87 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2005)). 
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en the inference of a threat of immediate harm sufficient for a finding of sec-
ond-degree robbery.121 
The court then articulated the standard used to determine the existence 
of a threat of force as “whether a reasonable person would believe his con-
duct was a threat of the immediate use of physical force.”122  In determining 
that Brooks did create an implicit threat of force, the court placed particular 
emphasis on the setting where the theft occurred.123  The court reasoned that 
banks are “regular targets of robberies, and their employees have a height-
ened awareness of security threats.  A demand for money in that context is an 
implicit threat of the use of force in and of itself.”124  The court supported this 
reasoning by citing a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit case, United 
States v. Gilmore, where the defendant was prosecuted under the federal bank 
robbery statute, which requires that the crime take place in a “bank, credit 
union, or any savings and loan association.”125 
Looking to the facts of the case, the court noted Brooks’s use of a wig, 
cap, and sunglasses as evidence of his “clear purpose to steal money.”126  The 
court found the threat of force to become immediate when Brooks handed the 
teller the note that demanded money.127  Further, when Brooks slammed his 
fist on the counter, which the court noted was forceful enough to startle the 
other tellers, this could also be considered a threat of the use of immediate 
physical force.128  Then, when the teller walked away to retrieve the money, 
Brooks continued to watch her closely, which the court interpreted as a warn-
ing to the teller that Brooks understood bank procedure and would know if 
she did anything to alert the police.129  The court found that a reasonable in-
ference was that Brooks’s actions exhibited a threat of immediate physical 
force if the teller did not obey Brooks’s commands.130 
Finally, the court applied the objective standard for a threat: “[W]hether 
a reasonable person would believe his conduct was a threat of the immediate 
use of physical force.”131 Intriguingly, the court applied this standard by look-
ing at how the teller reacted to Brooks’s actions, as opposed to whether a 
reasonable person in Brooks’s shoes would believe his conduct induced a 
threat as the standard states.132  Reasoning that the victim “felt threatened,” 
 
 121. Id. (citing State v. Applewhite, 771 S.W.2d 865, 867–68 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1989)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (citing United States v. Gilmore, 282 F.3d 398, 402–03 400 (6th Cir. 
2002)); Gilmore, 282 F.3d at 400 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012)). 
 126. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676–77. 
 127. Id. at 677. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 676. 
 132. Id. at 677. 
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the court held that Brooks “implicitly threatened the use of immediate physi-
cal force,” and his conviction of second-degree robbery was affirmed.133 
V.  COMMENT 
The difficulty in determining whether a defendant threatened the imme-
diate use of physical force is reflected in the inconsistent outcomes that Mis-
souri courts have reached in second-degree robbery cases over the past three 
decades.  The Supreme Court of Missouri has apparently sensed the confu-
sion that trial and appellate courts are operating under and has taken on trans-
fer of two second-degree robbery cases dealing with the threat of force in the 
past year.134  It appears the court is attempting to define a uniform standard 
by which Missouri courts should measure the threat of force, and the standard 
appears to be quite prosecutor-friendly. 
This Part begins by explaining the significance between being convicted 
of second-degree robbery and stealing, then examines the standard applied in 
Brooks, followed by a discussion of an alternative solution to the problem of 
determining whether a defendant threatened force when taking money from a 
bank. 
A.  Why the Difference Between Second-Degree Robbery and Stealing 
Matters 
For a criminal defendant, the difference between being convicted of 
second-degree robbery and stealing is more than just a matter of semantics.  
In 2013, only eighteen percent of defendants convicted of stealing (value 
$150 or more) were sentenced to time in prison, and those who were given 
prison time where given an average sentence of only 4.4 years.135  However, 
fifty-three percent of defendants convicted of second-degree robbery were 
required to serve time in prison and were sentenced to an average of 8.7 years 
in prison.136  With the average prison sentence for second-degree robbery 
almost twice that of stealing, it is crucial that the Supreme Court of Missouri 
articulate a clear standard for examining a threat of force so that criminal 
defendants and their attorneys are able to present their best argument at trial.  
B.  Defining the Standard 
The problem with the standard articulated by the court in Coleman is 
that it is not entirely clear from whose perspective the threat is being evaluat-
ed – the victim or the defendant.  The standard, as the Supreme Court of Mis-
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 673; State v. Coleman, 463 S.W.3d 353 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 135. MO. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM’N, USER GUIDE 2012–2013, at 44 (Apr. 
26, 2013), http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45394. 
 136. Id. at 37. 
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souri articulated it, is “whether a reasonable person would believe his conduct 
was a threat of the immediate use of physical force.”137  The plain meaning of 
this standard seems to be whether a reasonable defendant would believe his 
conduct would be perceived as a threat.  However, contrary to the literal read-
ing of the standard, the court applied the standard as whether a reasonable 
person in the victim’s position would feel threatened by the defendant’s con-
duct.138  For example, in applying the standard, the court looked at whether a 
reasonable teller would interpret Brooks’s disguise as a threat,139 whether the 
teller would feel threatened by Brooks watching her as she got the money,140 
and whether Brooks banging his hand on the counter would be perceived as a 
threat.141  Thus, in application, the court is actually applying a different 
standard than the one articulated in Brooks.  Of course, instituting an objec-
tive standard has appeal when trying to determine something as subjective as 
a threat, where a statement that might be perceived as a threat to some people 
would not be interpreted as a threat by others.  However, by creating an am-
biguous standard, the court has not resolved the confusion surrounding the 
threat of force in second-degree robbery cases. 
Assuming the standard the court intended to articulate was whether a 
reasonable person would interpret the words or actions of the defendant as a 
threat, the court set a low bar for prosecutors to prove that the defendant’s 
actions constituted a threat of the immediate use of physical force.  The rea-
son the bar is lower for prosecutors under the new standard is that it is inher-
ent in an act of stealing that a reasonable person would feel threatened by any 
action that the defendant takes, whether or not their conduct implies the im-
mediate use of physical force.  For example, the court reasoned in Brooks that 
by Brooks slamming his hand forcefully on the counter, of which the force-
fulness was a matter of factual dispute,142 the teller “[n]aturally . . . felt ‘terri-
fied’ and that she ‘had to follow through with the note to keep [her] co-
workers and [her] self safe.’”143  The court acknowledged that Brooks did not 
use any threatening language or physical mannerisms during the theft other 
than the hand slap,144 so it hardly seems determinative that a hand slap alone 
would cause someone to fear the immediate use of physical force. 
The crucial factor that was not contemplated in the court’s standard is 
that this theft took place in a bank, a unique factual setting that distinguishes 
it from many other robberies.  Instead, the court noted that banks are a regular 
target for robberies, and bank employees have a “heightened awareness of 
 
 137. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 676. 
 138. Id. at 677. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Appellant’s Substitute Brief, supra note 4, at *6; Respondent’s Brief, 
supra note 5, at *6. 
 143. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 677 (alterations in original). 
 144. Id. at 675, 677. 
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security threats.”145  In fact, the court placed such emphasis on the location of 
the theft in its reasoning that it stated, “[a] demand for money in [a bank] is 
an implicit threat of the use of force in and of itself.”146  The court is essen-
tially stating that any theft that occurs in a bank while customers or employ-
ees are present is necessarily an implicit threat of force, regardless of whether 
the defendant acts in a threatening manner or not.  As a result, the Brooks 
standard and reasoning contemplates an act of stealing that takes place in a 
bank and ignores how this lenient standard will affect those defendants 
charged with second-degree robbery outside of the bank context. 
C.  Bank Robbery Statute 
A solution to the outcome in Brooks would be for the Missouri legisla-
ture to enact a separate bank robbery statute that removes the force or threat 
of force element, while maintaining the traditional forcible stealing element 
for thefts that occur outside of a bank or financial institution.  Rather than 
focus on whether the party who steals from a bank uses or threatens force, the 
statute would penalize stealing147 and robbery the same, thereby eliminating 
the need to find force in order to convict under the statue.  This seems to be 
what the court was suggesting in Brooks, as it relied heavily on cases apply-
ing the federal bank robbery statute,148 which includes both stealing and rob-
bery as alternative conduct elements for the crime.  Further, enacting a statute 
that specifically punishes bank robbery would also be significant for the pub-
lic policy it encourages: if you steal or attempt to steal from a bank, there will 
be a harsh punishment, regardless of whether force is threatened, due to the 
inherent security risks that accompany that crime. 
One significant benefit of having a state statute specifically for bank 
robbery is that it can punish anyone who steals from a bank uniformly, as 
opposed to the problematic system of trying to determine whether the defend-
ant committed second-degree robbery or stealing.  For example, Michigan 
has enacted a bank robbery statute that finds a person guilty of bank robbery 
if he or she commits the crime of stealing or robbery, or has the intent to 
commit robbery or stealing from a bank.149  Including the intent to commit 
the crime of stealing or robbery in the statute further removes the need to 
focus on the use of force in the crime.  Rather, the use of force is treated as a 
determinative factor in the sentencing of the crime, where the sentence is 
harsher if force was used in the commission of the robbery.150 
 
 145. Id. at 676. 
 146. Id. 
 147. MO. REV. STAT. § 570.030 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 148. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d at 677. 
 149. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.531 (West 2016). 
 150. See id. 
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The federal government has also enacted a specific bank robbery statute, 
as alluded to in the Brooks decision.151  Similar to the statute enacted in 
Michigan, the federal statute makes it a criminal offense to even enter a bank 
with the intent to commit stealing or robbery.152  The federal statute was orig-
inally limited to robbery, but expanded the statute to include stealing due to 
the “incongruous results” that would commonly arise when the defendant 
would not use or threaten force during the commission of the crime and there-
fore not be liable under the statue for robbery.153  Also like the Michigan stat-
ute, the federal statute imposes higher penalties for anyone who attempts to 
steal from a bank and puts someone’s life in danger in the process, allowing 
punishment up to and including the death penalty if someone is killed during 
the commission of the offense.154 
A possible criticism of enacting a state bank robbery statute could be 
that there is not a substantive difference between robbery of a bank and rob-
bery of a person on the street that merits separate standards.  Admittedly, all 
types of robbery pose significant threats to the victim’s safety, regardless of 
the location of the act.  However, the robbery of a bank is inherently more 
dangerous, as there are typically armed security guards, customers, and a 
number of employees the defendant has to communicate with to retrieve the 
money or property they demand.  For example, there were 3972 reported 
robberies and larcenies committed at banks and financial institutions across 
the United States in 2014.155  During the commission of those offenses, sixty-
three people were injured, and an additional thirteen were killed.156  In 2014, 
Missouri had ninety-three robberies at banks and financial institutions – 
among the highest in the country.157  Compared to a standard robbery where 
there is usually only one victim,158 the policy behind punishing bank robbery 
more severely is based upon the higher number of victims present and the 
increased probability a victim would be hurt or killed. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The court in Brooks articulated a uniform standard to be applied when 
determining whether a defendant used or threatened the immediate use of 
physical force during the commission of a robbery.  This decision was based 
in large part on the fact that the robbery took place in a bank, and the Su-
 
 151. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2012). 
 152. Id. § 2113(a). 
 153. Drechsler, supra note 51, at § 2(b). 
 154. Id. at § 3. 
 155. FBI, Bank Crime Statistics, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 1, https://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/bank-crime-statistics-2014/bank-crime-statistics-2014 (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2015). 
 156. Id. at 3. 
 157. Id. at 6. 
 158. Dierker, supra note 44. 
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preme Court of Missouri issued an overly lenient standard for what consti-
tutes a threat of force that will now apply to all second-degree robbery cases.  
A practical solution to the problem the court was trying to address would be 
for the Missouri legislature to enact a bank robbery statute that eliminates the 
force element for the crime of robbery when committed in a bank, but retain 
force as an element in ordinary robbery cases. 
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